Thursday, March 6

Kimberley Relieved - Ladysmith Relieved - Majuba Day is Avenged

Whether it was the crushing defeats of January that changed the course of the war will, perhaps, never be known. What is certain, though, is that in February every man shared a morale so high that it brought an angel to every shoulder, and a confidence so great that it added the worth of an extra battalion to every conflict. Lord Roberts was rampant in the Orange Free State; General Buller strode the Natal as a giant. In just two weeks of brilliantly planned and heroically fought actions, the siege of Kimberley is broken; Cronje surrenders at Paadeberg; the Tugela Hills are won; Ladysmith is relieved and Botha’s army is fleeing to the north. The happy coincidence that these successes synchronised on February 27th with the anniversary of Majuba Hill, wiping out a dishonour of nineteen years' standing felt throughout the British Army, will doubtless feature in the newspapers of the day more highly than the catalogue of courageous leadership and individual heroism that made them possible. My diary notes for the month are included here to provide the fine detail so easily missed when viewing the broad sweep of history ...

1 February 1900 - The forced crowding and inactivity has led to outbreaks of sickness and many of the men are suffering with dysentery
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2 February 1900 - The medical staff at Chieveley are working miracles to keep us free from the enteric fever that is sweeping Lord Roberts troops
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3 February 1900 - After two days of difficult hauling our heavy artillery is now in place on Swartz Kop and the Boer positions are within range
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3 February 1900 - General Buller prepares to assault Vaal Krantz in his third attempt to break through the Boer lines blocking the road to Ladysmith
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3 February 1900 - I join Churchill with Major Lyttleton's Light Brigade and we move down the Tugela overnight to Mungers Drift opposite Vaal Krantz
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4 February 1900 - General Buller outlines his plan to capture Vaal Krantz, move east from Brakfontein and drive a wedge through from ridge to ridge
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4 February 1900 - If Buller succeeds with his Vaal Krantz plan the way will be open for a full frontal attack that will crumble the Boer defences
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4 February 1990 - As evening falls, the Engineers prepare their equipment for bridging the Tugela at Munger's Drift under cover of darkness
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5 February 1900 - Our attack is launched at first light with Colonel Murdoch, Lord Dundonald and Colonel Wynne leading a 3-pronged assault on Vaal Krantz
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5 February 1900 - Guided by the war balloon above, a thunderous barrage from our field guns ravaged the Boer trenches and silenced their fire
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5 February 1900 - Covered by our artillery, the Engineers bridge the Tugela and half of Major Lyttleton's force is across before the Boer realises
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6 February 1900 - After a day of competing gunfire, the order was given to "fix bayonets and charge" at which point the Boer turned and fled
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6 February 1900 - Vaal Krantz was ours but this was a victory destined not to last - by dusk the Boer had a Maxim in place raking our lines
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6 February 1900 - Lacking cover on the veldt, Major Lyttleton's Light Brigade suffered terrible privations and at sunset was forced to withdraw
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6 February 1900 - General Hildyard replaced Major Lyttleton and, with fresh troops in the field, routed the Boer and held the position at Vaal Krantz
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7 February 1900 - In military terms, General Buller's plan was a success. Topographically, though, we were beaten and could not press our advantage
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7 February 1900 - We had no advantage from Vaal Krantz and could not re-take Spion Kop - at dusk, General Buller calls his staff to a council of war
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8 February 1900 - Nobody can believe that the decision of our generals is that we are to retreat again - just what has everybody died for?
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8 February 1900 - Major General Hart is incensed at the decision to withdraw and demands that he is allowed another attempt to take Spion Kop
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9 February 1900 - Hart's protestations are to no avail and by midday we are again south of the Tugela wending our miserable way back to Chieveley
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10 February 1900 - What sadness must the hapless souls of Ladysmith be feeling as they hear of yet another British defeat and withdrawal
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10 February 1900 - As General Buller regroups at Chieveley, Lord Roberts launches his main attack planning to outflank the Boer at Magersfontein
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10 February 1900 - After supervising necessary command changes General Buller, shunning sleep, leaves for a reconnaissance of the Hlangwane foothills
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11 February 1900 - General Buller calls a conference to announce that he is putting everything into his fourth attempt to break through to Ladysmith
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11 February 1900 - General Buller's plan is to capture Hlangwane and hold this position at all costs to render all the surrounding hills untenable
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11 February 1900 - General Hildyard reports to General Buller that we have a superiority of ten-to-one in artillery and four-to-one in troop numbers
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11 February 1900 - I join Lt Colonel Byng on a reconnaissance to Hussar Hill, south-east of Hlangwane, overlooking Colenso and the route to Ladysmith
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11 February 1900 - We are massing a huge force but many Boer families have joined their menfolk in the laagers, fatally encumbering Botha's army
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12 February 1900 - From our reconnaissance report General Buller decides that Huzzar Hill, Mt Cingolo and Monte Cristo must be taken before Hlangwane
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12 February 1900 - Scouts report that Lord Roberts has outflanked the Boer at Magersfontein and Major General French is preparing to attack Kimberley
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12 February 1900 - Lord Roberts signals General Buller to confirm battle plans; both forces will strike within days, leaving the Boer nowhere to run
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12 February 1900 - News of our imminent attack has raised morale and re-ignited the mens' fire - General Buller is a man walking as a giant again
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13 February 1900 - Signal from HQ confirms that Major General French has advanced 70 miles in 3 days and is now over the Modder with Kimberley in sight
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13 February 1900 - Lord Kitchener has joined Major General French and they have taken control of the Modder river crossings at Rondeval and Klip Drift
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13 February 1900 - New field guns arrive as General Buller prepares the advance to Huzzar Hill and Hlangwane, now referred to as the Tugela Heights
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13 February 1900 - General Buller prepares for final push to Ladysmith and Major General French for Kimberley. Coincidence, or a signal that the end is near?
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14 February 1900 - General Buller's entire army is now on the move eastward to mount a three-pronged attack on the Boer positions on Huzzar Hill
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14 February 1900 - Our field guns blast the Boer but, as at Colenso, they repeat their tactic of silence allowing us to advance without hindrance
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14 February 1900 - After three hours against only a handful of sniper shots, Lord Dundonald's mounted brigade is in position to lead the final charge
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14 February 1900 - Late afternoon and hell is unleashed as the Boer open fire with everything they have - but too late - by dusk the Hill is ours
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14 February 1900 - No news of Major General French but we hear he has promised Lord Roberts that if he is still alive he would be in Kimberley by 15th
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15 February 1900 - After last night's capture, Huzzar Hill has today become a fortress with the full might of our artillery blasting the Boer
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15 February 1900 - Signal received at HQ that Major General French has broken through and Kimberley is relieved - a thunderous cheer splits the sky
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15 February 1900 - While still heavily defended by the Boer, the Tugela Heights are open before us and Hlangwane then Colenso must shortly fall
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16 February 1900 - We hear that the people of Kimberley suffered terribly during their ordeal, spurring us even more towards freeing Ladysmith
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17 February 1900 - General Buller's entire force sweeps from ridge to ridge towards Mount Cingolo, forcing the Boer to retreat to Monte Christo
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17 February 1900 - By sunset, Mount Cingolo is cleared of the enemy, our guns are in position and Monte Christo and Hlangwane are under fire
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17 February 1900 - With no rest from his actions at Kimberley, Major General French is in hot pursuit of Cronje's forces now fleeing for Bloemfontein
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18 February 1900 - All day our guns have pounded the Tugela ridges and now the infantry is subduing resistance on the flanks of Monte Christo
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18 February 1900 - With Monte Christo held, Hlangwane can not be long defended and after just a few hours rest Colonel Thorneycroft's troops sweep in
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18 February 1900 - Major General French catches up with the fleeing Boer, trapping Cronje and 5000 troops in a laager at Paadeberg on the Modder River
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18 February 1900 - Major General French and Lt General Kelly-Kenny propose bombarding the Boer into submission but Lord Kitchener orders a frontal assault
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18 February 1900 - Another day of disaster. Lord Kitchener's insistence on frontal assault leaves some 80 officers and 1000 men killed or wounded
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19 February 1900 - Storming across the ridges towards Hlangwane, Colonel Thorneycroft's brigade disturbs the Boers preparing their breakfast
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19 February 1900 - The Boers flee before us, leaving behind their entire camp equipment, tons of ammunition and the Transvaal flag hanging limp
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19 February 1900 - As the Boer abandons Hlangwane and the entire south of the Tugela, General Hildyard calls up our heavy artillery to bear on Colenso
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19 February 1900 - Lord Roberts arrives at Paadeberg and, surprisingly, refuses Cronje's request for a cease-fire to recover and bury the dead
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19 February 1900 - Lord Kitchener calls for more frontal assaults but, after a day of staff meetings, it is agreed that bombardment is better
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20 February 1900 - Boer positions are falling like dominoes and our infantry have now occupied Colenso and advanced the front to Colenso Station
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20 February 1900 - The Dublin Fusiliers press forward to the river under heavy shelling from a Boer brigade that has regrouped on the north bank
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20 February 1900 - Botha is forced to abandon Fort Wylie, his last defended position south of the Tugela - the Boer line must now give way
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20 February 1900 - With the Tugela still muddied by the fleeing Boer, our Engineers are already throwing pontoons across the river behind them
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20 February 1900 - Unable to withstand the increasingly heavy bombardment at Paadeberg, De Wet withdraws his commandos and abandons Cronje
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20 February 1900 - Signal received today from Lord Roberts HQ that we must press ahead with all haste or they will defeat the Boer before we do
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21 February 1900 - Under heavy fire General Coke leads three brigades across the Tugela, forcing the Boer to withdraw from the ground before Colenso
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21 February 1900 - Major General Wynne's 11th Brigade follow General Coke's troops across the river and capture the key Boer position at Horse-shoe Hill
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21 February 1900 - Confidence is now surging through all of us but we must remember the cost: almost 3000 killed and missing in the past month
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21 February 1900 - With De Wet gone, Cronje has 4500 men left at Paadeberg: he has said he will not surrender and they will surely die for nought
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22 February 1900 - Botha rallies his troops atop Grobler's Kloof and Pieter's Hill but gathering at the foothills are General Coke's three brigades
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22 February 1900 - After eight days and nights of continuous fighting, Botha's resistance is still costing us many lives for every yard gained
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22 February 1900 - The Inniskillings take appalling fire at Pieter's Hill - at roll call just 1 officer and 43 men answer for the 500 that had gone in
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22 February 1900 - Major General Wynne pushes forward from Horseshoe to a hill-top position north of Colenso and reports that Ladysmith is in sight
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22 February 1900 - Lord Roberts learns that women and children are with Cronje's men but his offer of a safe passage out for them is refused
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23 February 1900 - We are across the Tugela but every step of our way is frustrated by snipers and sharpshooters lurking in the brush and dongas
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23 February 1900 - Every division is now in conflict with the Boer over an area of four square miles between Grobler's Kloof and Pieter's station
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23 February 1900 - They defend to the death but a heliograph from Ladysmith tells us that lines of Boer wagons are already racing back to the Drakensberg
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23 February 1900 - It was just an hour before sunset when Colonel Thackeray's brigade crested Grobler's Kloof and won the first advantage of the day
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24 February 1900 - Without waiting for reinforcements Major General Hart storms the next hill to the north but his brigade is routed by a Boer rearguard action
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24 February 1900 - The Boer cling doggedly to their hill-top and more than 500 officers and men die in Major General Hart's valiant but failed action
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24 February 1900 - Pride swells every heart as we watch Lt Inkson carry his wounded comrade over four hundred yards under brutal fire to safety
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24 February 1900 - As chess pieces, General Buller moves his troops to strategic positions in a bid to outthink and outflank the Boer in the end-game
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25 February 1900 - As dawn breaks General Buller sends reinforcements to every forward position but the Boer resistance prevents any further advance
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25 February 1900 - Signals from Ladysmith indicate that behind their defiant lines of defence the Boer are abandoning their laagers and retiring
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25 February 1900 - A 6 hour truce is agreed to recover our wounded but from one bloodied Tugela hillside we recover just 3 survivors and 80 dead
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25 February 1900 - Report from Lord Roberts HQ tells us that hundreds of our troops are dead but the Boer is being crushed by our rolling bombardment
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25 February 1900 - General Buller orders the Engineers to move the pontoons north where, hidden by a bend in the river, we can form a new bridgehead
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26 February 1900 - General Buller orders a massive two-pronged assault - General Warren to attack the Boer left, Major Lyttleton the centre and the right
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26 February 1900 - For once it appears that General Buller has outhought Botha; having failed to anticipate our moves, the Boer retreat gathers pace
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26 February 1900 - Our three goals are Pieter’s Hill, the Railway and the hill that has become known as Harts;confidence is high for all of them
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26 February 1900 - Even in retreat the Boer hotly contests every yard of ground before finally turning and fleeing in the face of our forces
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26 February 1900 - Lord Roberts and General Buller both intend to force their enemy to defeat tomorrow to remove the festering sore that is Majuba
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27 February 1900 - Covered by a fearsome barrage, General Barton closes in first, then General Wynne and Col Norton - the Boer is now in full retreat
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27 February 1900 - Driven from Pieter's Hill, the Railway and Grobler's Kloof, Botha's line is broken at last and the road to Ladysmith is open
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27 February 1900 - A final charge by General Norcott's 4th Brigade clears the last crest and a huge cheer erupts as the Boer flee - it is Majuba Day
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27 February 1900 - Under cover of darkness, the Royal Canadians advance and entrench within yards of Cronje’s positions for a final dawn attack
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27 February 1900 - The Boer awake at dawn to find themselves staring into the muzzles of Canadian rifles - surrender is now their only option
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27 February 1900 - Cronjé surrenders at 6.00am with some 4000 men and 50 women and the slaughter at Paadeberg is at last over - it is Majuba Day
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28 February 1900 - We watch a great column of Boer horsemen and wagons moving rapidly north from Ladysmith but General Buller orders us not to follow
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28 February 1900 - Cyclists scorched into the city to confirm the news, signal rockets lit the sky and a ragged, shoeless crowd raced to meet us
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28 February 1900 - It is 5pm as two squadrons of British infantry commanded by Major Gough ride into Ladysmith to be greeted by General White
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28 February 1900 - Within just 24 hours, General Buller has broken through, Cronje has surrendered and Ladysmith is relieved - Majuba Day is revenged


General French crossing Klip Drift en route to Kimberley


General Cronje surrenders at Paadeberg
27th February 1900

Major Gough’s relief force in Ladysmith
28th February 1900


Media celebrations of the relief of Ladysmith

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Tuesday, February 4

A Force to Finally Defeat the Boer

It is too simple and too quick a judgement to cast blame and recrimination for the crushing losses of an entire army on to the shoulders of one man; particularly when that man is the very one that can lift his men from defeat to victory. The British government, though, took the defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso badly and, with Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith stll under siege, saw this as the nadir of General Buller's career, sending in Lord Roberts as his replacement, together with yet more troops amounting to some 180000 men with further reinforcements being sought. It is widely reputed that this will be the largest force Britain has ever sent overseas and, in my diary notes for January, a number of observations suggest that, regardless of who is Commander-in Chief, this must be the force that finally defeats the Boer ...

1 January 1900 - Churchill confides to me and Burleigh that he will stand for Parliament in the next election - but first there is a war to win
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1 January 1900 - No New Year celebrations but morale is high at the news that Lord Kitchener has joined Lord Roberts - arriving in a few days
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2 January 1900 - General Buller must know that his time as commander is limited but he orders General Hildyard to prepare for another attack on Colenso
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3 January 1900 - The floods on the Tugela are receding and the opportunity to exploit General Hildyard's plan to attack Hlangwane is now lost
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3 January 1900 - Reports are filtering in that the Boer is building a dam on the Klip so that the river will overflow and flood Ladysmith
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4 January 1900 - The recent Boer victories have led them to prepare a ludicrous plan for peace including the surrender of Mafeking and Ladysmith
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5 January 1900 - Our scouts report that the Boer is withdrawing from Colenso in preparation for an all-out assault on the garrison at Ladysmith
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5 January 1900 - General Buller decides that we can not follow the Boer because, although the flood is receding, the Tugela still blocks our route
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6 January 1900 - At 2.00 am the Boer crept up against the Ladysmith defences, climbed Wagon Hill and attacked 'Caesar's Camp' south of the town
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6 January 1900 - A day of skirmishes followed Joubert's dawn attack but never did the Boer make a greater mistake than to attack in the open
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7 January 1900 - Seldom will history record a more prolonged or desperate duel between two bodies of resolute men than at Caesars Camp yesterday
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8 January 1900 - Over 360 of General White's officers and men died in the battle for Caesar's Camp - but the Boer suffered even more heavily
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8 January 1900 - Disheartened and angry, the Boer returns to Colenso and Joubert immediately redeploys his forces along the banks of the Tugela
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9 January 1900 - Still blocked by the Tugela floods, officers with tiny escorts risked death by day and by night to sketch the Boer positions
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9 January 1900 - Unable to engage in battle, this has become a war of the mind - of feint and subterfuge - neither side can gain any advantage
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9 January 1900 - On the chess-board of Natal the skilled players, General Buller and General Joubert, are now able to anticipate each move of the other
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10 January 1900 - High spirits and a mood of excitement sweeps camp at the news that Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener have landed at Cape Town
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10 January 1900 - General Buller issues orders that we are to forge a crossing of the Tugela at Potgeiter's Drift, which lies 22 miles west of Frere
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11 January 1900 - Lord Dundonald signals that he has seized the bridge over the little Tugela and is proceeding under forced march to Swartz Kop
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11 January 1900 - After what seems like an eternity of inaction, we are on the move, making rapid progress with General Buller's traction engines
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12 January 1900 - An entire army moved more than twenty miles across difficult country in less than 24 hours - an incredible achievement
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13 January 1900 - General Warren has pressed into the township of Springfield and taken up a strong position overlooking the Little Tugela Bridge
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13 January 1900 - Before nightfall General Clery has cleared the Boer from an area of two miles around Springfield and bivouacked outside the town
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14 January 1900 - General Hildyard is now camped at Pretorius Farm within easy reach of Deel's Drift and the fords at Tugela junction
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14 January 1900 - With the first gleam of the morning sun a heliograph on Swartz Kop blinked the welcome news that Dundonald held the ferry
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14 January 1900 - General Warren moves his division westward against the Boer's extreme right flank, to cover General Hildyard's crossing of the Tugela
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15 January 1900 - General Buller establishes camp at Spearman's Farm, awaiting the final positioning of his divisions before launching his attack
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15 January 1900 - General Barton gains more time with a feint at Colenso, keeping the Boer occupied and allowing General Warren to advance further west
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16 January 1900 - General Warren is ready to cross the Tugela at Trigaard's Drift, while Major Lyttleton's Rifles await orders at Potgeiter’s Drift
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16 January 1900 - General Buller orders the advance but excessive caution seems to have gripped our band of General - is Colenso to be repeated?
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17 January 1900 - We are in position to attack but our Generals insist that we await a thorough build-up of logistics, supplies and reserves
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17 January 1900 - The Boer sits exposed on the ridges before us, awaiting developments but we are doing nothing, offering them no challenge
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18 January 1900 - General Buller's plan is for General Weller to force a way through the Boer lines and strike across the open country towards Ladysmith
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18 January 1900 - If General Weller's assault to cut through the Boer lines is quickly pressed, it will almost certainly be assured of success
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19 January 1900 - Cable from General Warren to HQ is received explaining the reason for delaying his attack on the Boer lines .. it makes little sense
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19 January 1900 - Lord Dundonald reaches the extreme flank of the Boer lines with a clear run to Ladysmith but is recalled to guard supplies
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19 January 1900 - General Clery has made no progress at Tabanyama in three days, and Major Lyttleton is still awaiting orders at Potgeiter's Drift
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20 January 1900 - The first hard blow is struck - with General Hildyard we leave Deel's Drift in a swift advance to support General Warren's right flank
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20 January 1900 - Churchill is with Lt Colonel Byng's South African Light Horse as they storm a high Kopje under fire to reinforce General Warren's left
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21 January 1900 - Corporal Tobin, an American with the Light Horse, climbs alone to the summit of a Boer kopje - and announces that the hill is his
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21 January 1900 - Under a massive bombardment from the rear, we charge across the intervening valley and take the line of kopjes below Spion Kop
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22 January 1900 - Signal from Lord Roberts HQ relieves General Buller as Commander in Chief but he temporarily retains control of current operations
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22 January 1900 - Our guns blast the Boer positions from dawn to dusk but fail to make any impact and we remain entrenched for the entire day
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23 January 1900 - General Buller arrives to survey our positions and, dismayed at the men's exposed conditions, he advised General Warren to retire
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23 January 1900 - At 6.30 pm General Woodgate and Lt Colonel Thorneycroft's Infantry advanced in the dusk to surprise the Boer positions on Spion Kop
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23 January 1900 - After 9 hours hard climbing the treacherous summit of Spion Kop was gained in complete surprise, the Boer fleeing in confusion
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24 January 1900 - By dawn a vicious rifle fire was opened on our position by a handful of Boer marksmen, who had crept up unseen in the fog
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24 January 1900 - In two hours the Boer fired over a thousand shells from Tabanyama against the exposed summit held by our thin line of khaki
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24 January 1900 - We held the Kop summit but despair, the final weapon that sometimes achieves victory, stimulated the Boers to heroic exertion
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24 January 1900 - Behind the cover of rocks and outcrops, the Boer crept to within yards of our position and opened a fire of slaughter upon us
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24 January 1900 - General Woodgate is shot through the head and dies before us - most of the officers are fallen and at least half of the men dead
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24 January 1900 - Major Lyttleton's brigade mounts a frontal attack, obtaining a ledge on the north spur, which they hold tenaciously under fire
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24 January 1900 - General Coke arrives with reinforcements but finds the ground littered with dying and dead - and turns back to General Warren’s HQ
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24 January 1900 - With the men battered and shot at until few had escaped injury, Colonel Thorneycroft is now in command and orders a withdrawal
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24 January 1900 - Carrying all our wounded but leaving our dead on the field, Colonel Thorneycroft leads us down quietly, evacuating in the darkness
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25 January 1900 - Last night’s withdrawal was accomplished without the loss of a man, but many wounded were not able to be moved and died today
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25 January 1900 - Our retirement was a heart-breaking experience and it now seems that each of those precious lives has been uselessly expended
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25 January 1900 - General Buller orders our forces to fall back across the Tugela for rest and recuperation - has all of this then been for nought?
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25 January 1900 - With hopes dashed once more, the hapless Ladysmith must settle again in despair to further fight their starvation and disease
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26 January 1900 - Only this morning did we discover that after our retreat the Boer had also withdrawn and, had we stayed, the battle was won
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26 January 1900 - We re-unite with Churchill who tells us that, as a courier for HQ, he carried the signal promoting Colonel Thorneycroft to General
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27 January 1900 - Three thousand reinforcements from Chieveley, together with a horse battery and more cavalry, arrived opportunely today
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27 January 1900 - The reports and analysis after Spion Kop identified a catalogue of poor decisions, command errors and communication failures
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27 January 1900 - General Buller blames General Warren: General Warren blames General Coke: General Coke blames General Warren: it seems that all are at fault
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28 January 1900 - Lord Roberts is now only days away and, despite his orders, General Buller decides to launch another attack to re-take Spion Kop
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28 January 1900 - Our final casualty count reveals 243 men killed and 1250 wounded or captured: the Boer has 335 casualties of which 68 are dead
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29 January 1900 - General Buller orders our heavy guns to be positioned atop Swartz Kop from where the Boer on Spion Kop will be within our range
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30 January 1900 - General Buller ignores the recriminations of the Spion Kop disaster and orders preparations for a further assault on Vaal Krantz
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30 January 1900 - Signal received from HQ to inform General Buller that Lord Roberts' forces are now positioned at Orange River and will advance to Kimberley
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31 January 1900 - Lord Roberts and Lord Methuen have now combined their forces of more than 40000 under the overall command of Major-General French
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31 January 1900 - Despite our recent losses and defeats there is a confidence beginning to spread from man to man like a bush fire on the veldt


General Warren's Message to HQ Staff




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Friday, January 24

The Battle for Spion Kop

It was in their concerted effort to relieve Ladysmith that Britain suffered one of its most extraordinary defeats of the war with the Boer at Spion Kop. A army of 22,000 British soldiers attacked, won and camped up on this small rocky hill, where, In the early misty hours of the next morning, they were attacked by around 3,600 Boers. The ensuing battle was a shambles. Messages were not delivered. No one knew who was in charge - at one point, three different British officers thought they were in command. People surrendered then changed their minds, and stopped firing because they thought they were firing on their own troops they weren't. The battle raged all day and in the end, both sides thought they'd lost and gave up the hill. It was only when four Boers crept back up to try and rescue wounded comrades that the truth came out and they took the day. Hundreds were dead, many more wounded and captured. The hill today is littered with graves of people buried where they fell.

On Tuesday, January 16th, General Sir Charles Warren was encamped below Springfield on the right flank of the Boer Lines when General Buller ordered the full advance. General Lyttleton's brigade was first across in the centre. The Rifles, crossing the flooded drift at Potgieter's by a continuous chain, formed along the bank in skirmishing order, sweeping the Boer outposts and advance guard back to the main position. They also laid down a vicious fire from the flanks until a pontoon ferry could be fixed and the howitzer and field batteries sent over.
      Seven miles further west General Warren threw his division over the Tugela, at Trigaardt's Drift, the Engineers erecting a pontoon under a heavy fire. He bivouacked at night toward the flank of the main Boer line, which extended southeast to Potgieter's along a series of ridges dominated by a great bastion, Spion Kop, on which the Boer right rested, and rapidly extended west along ridges through Acton Homes into the spurs of the Drakensberg, beacons being lit for reinforcements.
      Although in ideal position, an excessive caution seemed to have seized the British generals. Unwilling to repeat their failed tactics at Colenso, they clung to the outer flanks of the enemy while the artillery made a thorough preparation for assault, in which the kopjes suffered severely, the Boers resting securely in their bomb-proofs, or in rear of the ridges, awaiting developments. If the assault had been quickly pressed it would have stood greater chances of success.
      General Buller's idea, though, was to engage the enemy along the front while Warren's division forced its way by a detour through Acton Homes, passing round the Boer right and striking across the more open country to the hills surrounding Ladysmith. For this purpose he delayed until he had sufficient rations in reserve to send to General Warren. But while the troops in the centre had established themselves in positions that would keep the line of communications clear to the westward, General Warren, who was allowed great initiative, decided that it would be impossible to extend a line of communications round the extreme flank. He sent the following despatch for the commander-in-chief:


Telegram from General Warren to General Buller's HQ

A council of officers confirmed the impossibility of getting round with transport for only three days rations, and it was decided to force back the Boer line until the division could break the cordon and press through to the rear, via Rosalie, to raise the siege, with haversacks and emergency rations in lieu of transport.


Area of Operations - Natal (from "In South Africa with Buller")

On January 20th, the first hard blow was struck. General Hildyard moved from Deel’s Drift on the right to support General Warren, and the irregulars covered the left flanks. The Light Horse rushed recklessly into the fray on the left, carrying all before them, and storming a sugar-loaf kopje in face of a heavy fire. Several Americans serving with this force behaved with especial gallantry. Corporal Tobin, one of the coolest, and a trained athlete, outstripped his squadron in the ascent, and as the burghers clung close to cover, he reached the ridge unperceived. Disturbed by the shouts of the stormers below them, whom they could not assail, his hoarse voice rising suddenly from the crest itself, "Now, boys, in with the bayonet!" decided the burghers, and they swarmed down the reverse. Tobin seated himself nonchalantly on the summit, and announced to his breathless comrades that the hill was his. His fame spread from drummer-boy to general.
      The regulars closed in swiftly, General Hart's Irish in the centre and General Woodgate's brigade on the right. Their charge was covered by the concentrated fire of the field batteries, which disconcerted the burghers, and the entire row of entrenched ridges were brilliantly carried with the bayonet. But the disheartening topography of Natal killed the triumph. A second row of kopjes, even stronger, lay beyond; successive positions dominated the captured ridges, which became the objective of every gun in the vicinity. But sunset brought relief. When the next day, Sunday, was very young, the Boers, preparing their morning coffee, were sent to shelter by a sudden bombardment, under cover of which the irrepressible British charged across the intervening valley and carried the next position, despite heavy stone breastworks and a cross fire. The burghers did not appreciate the breach of the fourth commandment, and left their breakfasts cooking. But some of their gunners were "foreign infidels," and thus their guns could be worked with immunity on the Sabbath.
      On Monday 22nd, the British rested in the trenches under a heavy shell fire from the eminences in rear. The naval guns and field batteries strove all day to silence the artillery, but those splendid Boer gunners sustained a fire that could neither be silenced nor excelled.
      General Buller visited the position on the 23d, and was dismayed at the exposed condition of the division. He strongly advised General Warren to retire gradually and revert to the original plan of detouring on the left. He refused to sanction further delay; the assault must be pressed, he ordered, or abandoned for the former manoeuvre. It was pointed out that the massive eminences beyond must be taken by surprise, and that all preparations had been made for a night attack on Spion Kop. He then waived his supreme authority and left the operation to develop, so that the previous days' sacrifices might not be in vain.
      From Spion Kop to the hills against Ladysmith were sixteen miles of tolerably level veldt. With a hostile force there, the holding of the Tugela would have been impossible, and the Boers fully realized their weakness by making the Kop their strongest point. On the heights, trenches had been blasted from solid rock, and gun emplacements constructed on approved plans. The Kop is about four miles long, very steep on the western side, and with two high peaks on the northeast, and innumerable cuts and depressions in its gnarled, irregular summit. It completely bisected the Boer line. Held with artillery, it would become a pivot on which the right wing could be forced back, opening thereby a clear route to Ladysmith. The strong ridges of Brakfontein would also be exposed to artillery fire on their left rear, and rendered untenable.
      On the evening of January 23rd, at 6.30 pm. General Woodgate, with the Lancashire Fusiliers, Royal Lancashires, 17th Company Royal Engineers, and Lt Colonel Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, with two companies of the Connaught Rangers and the Imperial Light Infantry in support, advanced quietly to surprise the position. The stormers had a long and difficult advance in the darkness, but finally reached the Kop and commenced the ascent. After nine hours hard climbing, the treacherous summit, 1600 feet above the river, was gained. General Woodgate led the assault, guided by the fitful gleam of the Boer camp-fires. The camp was taken completely by surprise; the burghers, awakened from sleep, turned and fled in confusion, pursued by rapid volleys from the British, who gained the position with a loss of three men.
      The Engineers hastily constructed a trench, the rocky nature of the ground making it impossible to dig effectively. Rain had fallen the whole night and the troops were thoroughly exhausted by their long march and the ascent, but there was little time to rest. A crash of Boer artillery announced the early dawn. In the darkness the trench had been constructed across a gentle slope, so that guns from three sides could rake the position; and the defence was commanded by high spurs and irregular rocky eminences on the Kop itself, all of which could be reached without risk from the plain below, the approaches being entirely covered.
      Despite a heavy fog, the guns quickly found the range and commenced to search out every inch of the sorry breastwork so hurriedly constructed. And ere means could be taken to strengthen it, a rifle fire was opened by daring marksmen, who had crept up unseen in the fog and completely enfiladed the position. A few of their own shells burst near, but they were safely ensconced among the rocks, and faced them with impunity. From Taba Myoma, less than a mile distant, the enemy was able to sustain an incessant shrapnel fire. In two hours the Boers had fired over a thousand projectiles against the exposed summit held by the thin line in khaki. The automatic 1-pounders then added to the horrors, searching out the trench repeatedly, and despite all efforts of support, it became choked with dead and wounded.
      Attempts to strengthen the breastworks were repeatedly defeated by the resolute Boer riflemen, who pumped their Mausers incessantly all day and forced every one to cover, though they were less than 500 strong. But they knew the position, and thus were not so troubled by the fog, which completely baffled the British and negated any strong artillery support from the batteries before Potgieter's. And when the fog lifted, an advanced party of infantry, moving down to clear a connecting nek, were exposed to a a rain of projectiles from a British field battery firing under a misapprehension, to accomplish the same task.
      When General Warren commenced his operations Botha was on his way to Pretoria, and the first British success led the President to order him to supreme command on the upper Tugela. The burghers were hard pressed and disorganized when he arrived, and the subsequent loss of Spion Kop on his right centre was a hard blow to his plans. But this brave young farmer-general, whose modesty deserves the world's respect and his compatriots' emulation, had rapidly directed operations to retrieve the loss. The mist favoured him, and though it lifted, it soon gathered again. Covered by this fog, he led small parties of burghers to the summit and placed them in various points of vantage, where they could sweep the British exposed on the flat and lower portion of the eminence. Despair, the last weapon that sometimes achieves victory, stimulated the Boers to heroic exertion.
      In the fog some burghers crept within two yards of the advanced British position; others crawled behind rocks, where they could enfilade the shallow trench; then they opened simultaneously. More than half the soldiers had been killed or injured by shell fire, and the survivors were soon, forced to surrender. Shalk Burger sent a portion of his command to the spurs on the far side of the Kop, and they soon assailed the British rear, gaining splendid cover among the irregularities of the vast summit.



General Woodgate was shot through the head at this juncture, and most of the officers had fallen, but a company of troops in the main position fixed bayonets and attempted to expel the enemy from the ridge that they had gained on the crest. They were thrice forced back with loss, however, but then British reinforcements arrived, climbing the ascent enfiladed by the automatic gun. They drove the Boer riflemen from their lodgement, but found it impossible, from the formation of the ground, to get any cover from the shelling.
      Major Lyttleton's brigade strove to relieve the pressure by a frontal attack, the 60th Rifles gaining a footing on the northern spurs and the Scottish Rifles obtaining a ledge on the other side. They were exposed to severe small arms fire from the surrounding kopjes, but hung on tenaciously until dark. The gallantry of the regulars was equalled by the stolid bravery of the burghers, who showed the courage only inspired by intense devotion.
      When General Coke rode out to assume command of the Kop, darkness had stilled several of the Boer guns, though an intermittent shelling was sustained. The condition of the men on the summit was desperate, however. The ground was littered with dying and dead, the men had been without food or water, and were in no condition to sustain a further defence at daylight. Leaving Lt. Colonel Thorneycroft in charge, General Coke rode back to confer with General Warren as to the best means of strengthening the position, and Sir Charles at once arranged for artillery and engineers to be sent to the summit. A proper system of defence was devised, and preparations were made to hold the Kop at all hazards until resistance could be swept away on the flanks.
      Unfortunately, General Warren had remained on the extreme left to guide the turning movement. General Coke took long to reach him, and ere fresh orders arrived, the surviving officers on the Kop held a council of war, at which a large majority favoured evacuation to save extermination at daylight. A desultory cannonade started later, giving the worn men no chance to eat or rest. There is also a story of a despatch, intended for Colonel Riddell, ordering him to withdraw his force, the 60th Rifles, from the exposed position where they would mask the fire of the British artillery. The colonel had been killed prior to its delivery, and Lt. Colonel Thorneycroft, receiving the despatch, as next senior officer, applied it to the entire force. This incident is not mentioned in the reports of either Buller or Warren. The former says that Colonel Thorneycroft used a wise discretion, but Lord Roberts severely censures him for taking the initiative when he could have sent to consult Warren. The Divisional Commander is also blamed for remaining on the extreme flank and not visiting Spion Kop in person, when the entire success of the movement rested on its retention.
      Much may be said in Lt. Colonel Thorneycroft's favour. His worn men could not face the emergency. They had been battered and shot at until few had escaped injury, and the nocturnal shelling started a panic which only an order to retire averted. Carrying all the wounded, leaving the dead on the field, the shattered commands quietly, evacuated in the darkness, and were returning to the main British line when they met Colonel Sim with the Mountain Battery, two naval guns, a strong force of Engineers, and 600 men for a working party, going up to thoroughly entrench the position. Explanations followed. Officers on the spot had decided that the position was untenable in any case, and not as useful as supposed, being in turn dominated by other hills. With the time that elapsed to get a galloper to General Warren and receive his reply, dawn drew near, and it was too late to retrieve the blunder. Certainly no one could accuse Colonel Thorneycroft of cowardice or lack of resolve. He had far more dead, and wounded men who could not fire a rifle, than men able to fight; few had escaped splinter wounds. The exposed portion of the Kop was solid rock and could not well be entrenched, and he was not appraised of. the reinforcements destined for him. To save his wounded, it was necessary that the retreat should not be delayed. The only surviving staff officer, General Coke's Brigade Major, the Colonel of the Middlesex, and other officers strongly protested, however, against the decision.
      In the event, however, the withdrawal was accomplished without the loss of a man, but the ambulances could not get in close, and many wounded were not moved from the vicinity until the next day. A prejudiced writer could fill a chapter of incidents which would either prove the Boer a barbarian or a saint. Evidently the burghers vary greatly. Many of the dead were found with fingers hacked off for rings, a few abandoned wounded were robbed, and some murdered in cold blood. Yet Boers with tear-streaming faces gazed on the shattered bodies rent and mutilated by bursting shell, and many showed. kindness to the wounded.
      The retirement was a heart-breaking experience for the British. It seemed that the precious lives had been uselessly expended. For once Tommy was depressed, and his curious mixture of gaiety and serious determination became blended with a surly moroseness. Truly the companies on the Kop were heroes, and had fought to a clean knock-out. Yet there were hundreds of fresh soldiers ready to take their place, and in the end, they might have licked the Boers. The "squaddy " is a clear reasoner, and if he expressed his disgust at the whole operation in unparliamentary language, who shall blame him? He knew that to make the same mistake twice was unforgivable, and here twice was the British army checked by an army of farmers. The famished garrison in Ladysmith, so eagerly waiting for relief, were naturally despondent at this second failure, and the men who had long combated disease, wishing to keep off sick report to the end, could control themselves no longer, and the hospitals received a great influx of patients who had buoyed themselves up with a hope which long deferred made heart and body sick.
      General Buller now withdrew his forces across the Tugela, and the army had a spell of rest and recuperation. Spirits and resolution were alike restored in the interval. Three thousand reinforcements arrived opportunely to replace casualties. With them came a horse battery and more cavalry, and no one doubted the success that a third attempt to cut a passage would bring.
      On Saturday, February 3rd, the heavy guns were hoisted to the highest point of Swartz Kop, from which the guns the Boers had rapidly mounted on Spion Kop and Doom Kloof were outranged. The artillery also had clear play on the frontal ridges of Brakfontein, and for once the British gunners answered the Boers on equal terms and showed the Boer that under such conditions their fine shooting could be matched if not surpassed. But the effect of lyddite on the massive defences was trivial, and unless a shell exploded right in a trench the splinter-proofs sheltered the Boers from harm.
      For the third attempt to pierce the line of rock, steel, and brawn that barred the Ladysmith Road, General Buller decided to make Vaal Krantz his objective. This position runs almost at right angles to and east of Brakfontein, and its capture, it was thought, would enable a wedge to be driven from ridge to ridge until the reverse of the frontal position was assailed. A frontal attack pressed home at that juncture would crumble the defence of the line and open a wide gap to relieve White.
      On Monday, February 5th, the advance began, the augmented cavalry division being divided, Colonel Burn Murdoch taking the 1st Brigade and Lord Dundonald retaining his Colonials. Covered by a terrific bombardment, Colonel Wynne led forward General Woodgate's old brigade against the centre to cover the assault on the Krantz. For a time the Boers held their fire, but the infantry finally unmasked their guns, allowing a steady artillery duel, when their splendid gun pits alone kept their pieces in action. Shell after shell fell right against the epaulments, but failed to silence the guns.


Observation Balloon over the Tugela

The long grass on the hillside was speedily lit by shrapnel, but the war balloon, ascending high above the smoke, carefully located the Boer trenches, and by telegraph the positions were so dusted out with shrapnel from the concentrated field batteries that the rifle fire in the main position was practically silenced. A shell from the Vickers Maxim managed to reach the balloon, however, and temporarily ended its usefulness.
      Under cover of this assault, the Engineers bridged the Tugela lower down, at the dangerous Hunger's Drift' in direct line for Vaal Krantz, and half of Major Lyttleton's Light Brigade was over the river ere the flanking movement was discovered. But the ubiquitous burghers were soon in force, their guns were slewed round to meet the new attack, and the final movement was anticipated. But the regiments deployed along the river bank, and after a brief delay, during which the infantry and batteries covering the feint against the front were skilfully withdrawn under a heavy fire and the artillery diverted to the flank, the word was passed to fix bayonets and charge.
      Covered by a shower of shrapnel, the Light Infantry sprang forward from their shelter at a note of the bugle, and went straight against Vaal Krantz. In vain the burghers strove to stem the rush, and leaned over the brim of the leading trench to fire at their assailants crawling up the steep ascent. The British drew closer and closer, and ere they saw the glitter of the dreaded bayonets, the defenders fled panic stricken, though the leading company of the Durhams caught a number as they ran and cut through them, capturing many who surrendered.
      The capture of Vaal Krantz accomplished, a general concentration of guns was made, that the wedge of troops might be pressed further in. But again the configuration of Natal foiled a most able plan. Like most eminences in South Africa, the Krantz had a difficult face to assail, and it was found impossible to place artillery on the summit, but it sloped down gently on the reverse, and could be swept by Boers with gun and rifle. It did not extend far enough to cut into Brakfontein, as desired. A deep donga also enabled the Boer riflemen to advance within effective range, covered by their guns on the surrounding heights; and though ten thousand men might have carried out the movement, the risk of failure and the heavy loss that must be entailed without artillery support did not justify a further movement.
      As Major Lyttleton's brigade held to the captured position, a Boer ambulance drove quietly over the plain, a Red Cross flag flapping proudly. It reached a ridge a mile beyond, and coolly and in clear view unshipped a Vickers Maxim, just out of rifle range. Rocks were piled up before it, and soon the demoralising shells came buzzing over the British trenches. Rifle fire from a handful of snipers in the donga also tried the troops severely, and they were unable to leave the trenches for food or water. Until the second evening they held out, suffering terrible privations. After sunset the position was quietly evacuated, and General Hildyard replaced Major Lyttleton’s troops with the West and East Surrey and the West Yorks regiments.
      Counting on the fatigue and demoralisation of the British after long exposure, the Boers gathered in force to surprise and recapture the position. Crawling up the donga, they were able to form an extended line, and almost gain the crest before the outposts discovered them. But they found fresh troops awaiting them in the trenches, and were driven back with heavy loss. General Hildyard then maintained his position with ease, while the cavalry scouted in every direction with the hope of finding a weak spot assailable from the Krantz.
      General Hart's Irish Brigade demanded that they should be allowed to retrieve the disaster of Spion Kop, by attempting its recapture on February 7th, pointing out that with the occupancy of the Krantz the Boer forces could not be concentrated. But after a council of war all attempts to force the line on the west were discarded as impracticable, and by midday on the 8th the entire army was again south of the Tugela, wending its way back to the railhead at Chieveley.
      On Sunday, February 11th, the old camping-ground before Colenso was reoccupied, and hapless Ladysmith settled down once again in despair to further fight starvation and disease.

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Tuesday, December 31

Turning the Tide of War

In every war there comes a critical period when the tide turns. This is triggered sometimes by the outcome of a particular battle; sometimes by the unknowing and often uncaring intervention of ignorant politicians; sometimes by the life and death decisions of generals. In our conflict with the Boer, this period came early, just two months from the outset, and was primarily characterised by the arrival of General Sir Redvers Buller as supreme commander. His early successes in the field were soon followed by three crushing defeats, with many hundreds of men lost, killed and captured. This led to Buller's ultimate subordination and demotion but it was his leadership, battle-skills and bravery in the face of these adversities - and the way in which he was able to lift the minds of his men - that put us back on the path to victory. This is December 1899 and in my diary notes for the month I have attempted to chronicle the events of these trigger days and the ways in which they brought about the turning of the tide ...

1st December - General Hildyard moves camp to Frere and oversees superb effort to rebuild bridges destroyed by the Boer so that General Clery can advance
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2nd December - General Clery arrives at Frere and assumes command south of the Tugela in preparation for the immediate relief of Ladysmith
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2nd December - General Hildyard joins forces with Lord Dundonald and chases the fleeing Boer to within two miles of Colenso before withdrawing
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2nd December - General Buller arrives in Natal to personally lead major operations in the area and establishes his HQ at Pietermaritzburg
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3rd December - The railway line is now fully restored to Frere and trains are arriving rapidly at the front with troops, ammunition and stores
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4th December - No General or correspondent can understand why the Boer retreats so readily in the face of our forces as they are still building
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4th December - Scouts from Ladysmith report that despite constant shelling through November, losses have thankfully been relatively small
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4th December - Reinforcements arriving daily by train at Frere are mobilised to forward positions to prepare for the advance in force to Ladysmith
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5th December - Today, I ride out with Major Elliot (RE) to sketch the Boer positions beyond the Tugela - he risks his life daily gathering this reconnaissance
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6th December - Sir Redvers Buller arrives at Frere in the early hours - hundreds of eager troops turn out in the dark to welcome their Commander in Chief
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6th December - General Buller's first duty is to officiate at the funeral of the 47 heroes who died in the armoured train disaster - 2000 officers and comrades are in attendance
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6th December - Just hours after his arrival, General Buller joins Lord Dundonald’s cavalry to reconnoitre the Boer positions on the Tugela - our attack is being formulated
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7th December - After many failed attempts Captain Cayzer of the Dragoons has established heliograph communication with General White at Ladysmith
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7th December - Signals from Ladysmith confirm that casualties are light but lack of food and water poisoned by the Boer are the real killers
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7th December - A strange air of mirth and jollity pervades our preparations for battle at the news that today is General Buller's 60th birthday
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8th December - High morale today at the news that a sortie from Ladysmith last night under General Hunter spiked the Long Tom at Lombards Kop
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9th December - A second Long Tom atop Surprise Hill destroyed by a 250 strong sortie under Lieutenant Jones but at a cost of 60 killed and 28 captured
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9th December - General French outflanks the Boer with his horse artillery to attack and hold the vital railway at Naarport Junction
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10th December - The Boer is under heavy attack on all fronts: General Gatacre is closing on Stormberg and Lord Methuen is moving against Magersfontein
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10th December - My brief is still to be with General Gatacre so I am leaving today with a supply column to join him outside Stormberg
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11th December - General Gatacre is crushed by the Boer at Stormberg with 135 battle casualties and more than 600 captured in the field after retreat
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11th December - Lord Methuen attacks the Boer at Magersfontein but after a day long battle is forced to withdraw, losing 800 killed and wounded
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11th December - Relief for Kimberley and Mafeking is now delayed because of the repulses today of Lord Methuen and General Gatacre - a critical time
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12th December - General Clery has readied 22000 men and 44 guns for General Buller's attack on Botha's forces at Colenso, opening the road to Ladysmith
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12th December - On hearing of the losses at Stormberg and Magersfontein, General Buller changes his plan and decides to attack Colenso directly
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12th December - General Barton's Fusiliers set a battery of 6 naval guns to dominate the Boer entrenchments menacing the bridges over the Tugela
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12th December - Despite the defeats of Gatacre and Methuen, the Ladysmith relief force of 22000 men under General Clery is now fully prepared
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13th December - Failing to reach General Gatacre, I have been re-assigned to General Hildyard's brigade for the forthcoming attack and the onward press with the relief force
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13th December - General Barton opens the assault on Colenso with a massive bombardment but there is no reply from the Boer - have they withdrawn?
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13th December - After the devastating losses at Stormberg, General Gatacre has withdrawn to Molteno. I can not reach him so I stay with General Buller
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14th December - General Barton's guns are re-sited at Chievely and again pound the entrenched enemy positions but, again, the Boer remains silent
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14th December - There is much celebration in General Hildyard's camp tonight at the news that Churchill has escaped from the prison camp at Pretoria
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14th December - General Buller orders a full advance to a position beyond Chievely in preparation for an attack in force on Colenso tomorrow
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15th December - Camp at Chieveley was struck at 8 am and General Buller's entire force of 22000 men moved forward towards the Tugela and Colenso
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15th December - We passed over empty trenches and thought the Boer had fled, but then burst a thunder as if all the fiends of hell were loosed
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15th December - As the clock ticked to 9.15 am, from every ridge and trench in front of us, a terrible small arms fire burst in our faces
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15th December - The small arms assault on our front line was now joined by batteries of Maxims from across the river and the surrounding hills
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15th December - Within four hours of launching our attack, we were pinned down by the Boer on all sides and trapped in a cauldron of slaughter
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15th December - As his men and officers fall around him, General Buller orders a retreat - but hundreds are still trapped and can not escape
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16th December - An early morning armistice reveals 145 of General Buller's men killed and 1200 missing or wounded, with only 40 Boer casualties
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17th December - We carry our 300 wounded back to Chieveley but leave more than 800 of our comrades in the hands of Botha and his Boers
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17th December - How quickly disaffection spreads - the men who loved their leader yesterday now speak of him, not as Redvers but as Reverse
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18th December - After our recent defeats, the drive for victory has faltered and this war is reduced to a hotch-potch of minor skirmishes
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18th December - It is now beyond all doubt. General Buller's reputation is in tatters, he has lost the respect of his men and he must be replaced
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19th December - Our scouts report that General Joubert, now recovered, has returned to the front ... will he attack us as we regroup at Frere?
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20th December - Morale is once again lifted at the news that Lord Roberts is just days from Durban to take overall command from General Buller
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21st December - The news of Lord Roberts' imminent arrival has whetted the men's appetite for fighting and stiffened their resolve for victory
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22nd December - It seems from our field scout reports that the Boer is expecting us to desist and retreat after the defeat at Colenso - fools!
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23rd December - Confirmation received that Lord Roberts has left Southampton today on board the Dunottar Castle and is expected by mid January
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24th December - We remain locked at Chieveley with the Boer still barring any progress to Colenso or onwards - stagnation of men and minds
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24th December - The Boer has us trapped - so why are they now setting their limber and removing their guns, leaving the road to Colenso open?
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25th December - A truce on the Tugela fields today, but a fearful bombardment from the Boer robbed Ladysmith of any goodwill or peace on earth
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25th December - Our stores from home are delayed but a handful of Hussars march in with a dozen oxen stolen from the Boer .. dinner is served
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26th December - The distant thunder of an artillery storm over Ladysmith tells us now why the Boer removed their heavy guns from Colenso
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26th December - We are joined at Chieveley by seven units of Australians - ill-trained as regular soldiers, but highly effective against the Boer
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27th December - We hear today of a society event for the ladies of Cape Town - a day trip by train to see and touch the Long Toms at Ladysmith
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27th December - Bennett Burleigh arrives with four cartloads of cake, cigarettes and beer - men die while our war becomes stranger by the day
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28th December - Churchill returns and is greeted as a hero - he tells us of the excitement in Durban about Lord Robert's imminent arrival
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29th December - General Buller orders reconnaissance sorties to assess the strength of the Boer at Colenso, Fort Wylie and along the Tugela
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29th December - The incessant thunder of the shelling at Ladysmith increases by the hour - we must move soon or slaughter will surely follow
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30th December - The Tugela is in flood after massive overnight storms - hundreds of Boer on the Chieveley side are stranded and captured
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30th December - General Hildyard requests an attack on the Boer stronghold at Hlangwane after floods sweep away the bridge that they have built
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30th December - General Buller accepts General Hildyard's plan but orders that the attack must be meticulously planned in order to ensure success
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31st December - The Boer celebrates the century's end with a murderous shelling of the garrison and hospital at Ladysmith ... Happy New Year!

Generals and Commanders - December and January 1900

Lord Roberts

Lord Kitchener

General Buller

General White

General Gatacre

Lord Methuen

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Monday, December 30

Downfall of a Commander

Military Incompetence? Public Reaction? or Political Panic?

General Sir Redvers Henry Buller, known to all as “Reevers”, arrived at Frere during the early hours of December 6th 1899, the eager troops turning out in the darkness to give their leader a welcome that must have touched his soldier heart. A veteran of numerous campaigns, General Buller has earned no feather-bed honours; his V. C., G. C. B., and K. C. M. G. have been won with the sword in a literal sense and in the ranks he is respected as a stern disciplinarian. He combines the essential qualities for a commanding general; the strict discipline of the soldier, toned with tactful geniality as an administrator.
      His first duty as commander-in-chief was to officiate at the service held over the graves of the first heroes to fall in the relief of Ladysmith, the victims of the armoured train disaster. Over two thousand troops attended, with General Hildyard, Colonel Cooper, Prince Christian Victor, and many other officers. Doctrinal differences are forgotten in war, and since Dublins and Colonials lay together, Father Mathews, the plucky chaplain of the Fusiliers, and Rev. Mr. Twemlow, of the Colonials, combined for a simple and touching service, a possible tribute to the reunion of Christendom. As the farewell volleys echoed over the kopjes, the bugles softly sounding the last post, distant guns boomed out at Ladysmith as if conscious of the ceremony, and a fierce salvo of heaven's artillery reverberated through the mountains, typifying the insignificance of man in all his martial power.
      A few hours later, General Buller accompanied Lord Dundonald's cavalry brigade in a reconnaissance along the Tugela. The force halted on a ridge within range of Colenso, and the staff carefully studied the Boer position, apparently unnoticed by the enemy. The fords of the river were carefully noted, and the party returned safely, to formulate the plan of attack on Colenso and, subsequently, the relief of Ladysmith.
      During the next few days, buoyed by news that the Boer is under heavy attack on all fronts - General Gatacre is closing on Stormberg; and Lord Methuen is moving against Magersfontein - morale in camp reaches a new high. On the 10th news was heliographed from Ladysmith of two successful sorties made by the garrison to destroy the enemy's artillery. The first assault took place on the night of the 7th when, to preclude espionage, orders were only issued after "Lights out!" had sounded and the garrison retired. Two squadrons each of the Light-horse, Natal Carbineers, and Mounted Rifles, and sections of the diminished gunners of the 10th Mountain Battery and Royal Engineers were selected. Under General Hunter, with Major Henderson and twelve guides of the Intelligence Department, this force moved out at 11pm. against the Boer lines at Lombard's Kop, seven miles distant, which were breached without incident. Three explosions then announced to anxious Ladysmith that the enterprise was successful. The breech-fitting of the massive 40 pounder was torn out, the bore scored, the muzzle split, and the gun rendered useless. The Sappers completed the wreck with sledge hammers, smashing the sights, recoil buffer, and elevating gear, removing the breech-block as a trophy.
      General White arranged a second sortie two nights later to destroy a 4.7 inch howitzer on Surprise Hill, only three miles from camp. Colonel Metcalf with five hundred men of the Rifle Brigade followed General Hunter's tactics from the previous sortie, and two companies of stormers reached the hilltop unobserved. The Boers, however, were bivouacked in force close behind the gunpit, and though they were surprised and retreated hurriedly, they sustained a heavy fire from a further position. Lieutenant Jones coolly placed charges round the howitzer under a spatter of bullets, and lit the fuse. It failed to explode, and other commandoes closed in, but the Rifles held their ground steadily while another charge was prepared and ignited, this time successfully demolishing the piece. These successes by the Ladysmith garrison, however, were soon overshadowed by a series of critical defeats, which forced General Buller’s hand.
      General Gatacre, known in the army as "Backacher" from the feats of endurance that he has accomplished with his forces, marched his column against the Boer position at Stormberg, intending to surprise the laagers in the darkness and re-conquer the annexed district of Cape Colony. General Gatacre had only two thousand available men in his command, but, with an experienced guide, the column moved out from Putter's Kraal at 4 am. on December 9th, swooping down on Molteno, which was hovering between British and rebel control. Rapidly mobilising in the town, the force pressed forward after sunset along the left road to Steynsburg, intending to turn off at right angles to take the Boer position in flank.
      The risks of night operations in South Africa are stupendous, not the least of which are caused by the falsity of compass bearings among the ferruginous rocks and, unfortunately, the guide missed the turning and led the troops sixteen miles instead of nine. More faulty bearings finally placed the force on a further turning from the main road, which ran directly parallel to the reverse of the Boer position. Day was just breaking, the General was urging on his worn-out men, expecting every minute to find the target position looming up on his direct front, when a sudden and furious fire burst at close range along the entire length of his column. After a moment of confusion the leading companies took a sharp right turn, and dashed up the enfilading ridge. But perpendicular rock surmounted by loop-holed stone walls checked their onslaught, and the line was hurled back to the road as the British bugles sounded "Retire !"
      Shot at every foot of the way and worn-out by twenty four hours of continuous exertion, the column slowly extricated itself, fighting as it retired to Molteno, harassed by bullet and shell into the very outskirts of the city. When roll was called six hundred men out of the small column failed to answer their names, either killed, wounded or prisoners. It is little credit to the Boers that General Gatacre was not overwhelmed. Far superior in number, they had the column in a trap which simple tactics could have closed. But the Boer’s dislike of open fighting, even when great things might be accomplished thereby, enabled the British to execute their masterful retirement with three-fourths of their force intact.


General Gatacre’s forces trapped and under fire at Stormberg

On the western border Lord Methuen, after fighting severe but successful actions at Belmont, Graspan, and Modder River, hurling the Boers back at each step, moved against their main position at Magersfontein on December 11th. The Boers had been located along a line of steep kopjes, strongly entrenched. But the advance, which had appeared clear on the previous day to the scouts was found to be intersected by a long, cunningly concealed trench running along the base of the kopjes, and strongly defended by an impenetrable tangle of barbed wire.
      For two days a terrific bombardment had been sustained against the Boer position, and the column advanced confidently at midnight, expecting to surprise and overcome a demoralized enemy entrenched as of yore along the ridges. The Highland brigade was in the van, the men marching in quarter-column to sustain touch and direction in the darkness, the order being to extend along the base of the positions at dawn, after crossing the open without loss, and then press the attack.
      By 3.45 am. General Wauchope had led his men almost to the base of the kopjes, the Boer outpost guards, sleeping quietly, were captured, sleeping quietly and the men had even loaded without discovery. Then a rifle was discharged accidentally, there was a hoarse challenge from the long trench, awaking the Boers, who sprang to their arms and opened wild volleys into the darkness.
      Individual soldiers fired back, their flashes revealing the brigade, caught in massed formation but one hundred and sixty yards from the rifles. Men fell in heaps, but Wauchope rallied and hastily extended his regiments, and then ordered a charge. In the face of terrific volleys, the Highlanders swept into the wire defences, and though officers and men strove to break down the obstruction, mesh succeeded mesh, and the attacking line melted away before the point-blank fire, the supports falling back. Wauchope fell riddled with bullets at the head of his men.
      The supports rallied, reinforcements moved up, and, checked but undismayed, the British formed on the open veldt and lay pouring ineffectual volleys at the sheltered enemy from sunrise to sundown, exposed to a pitiless fire in return. At midday the Boer fire slackened, and again the Highlanders sprang up and dashed forward with the bayonet. Again the barbed wire checked them, the leading lines were swept away, and the remnant were driven back in dire confusion, their rout being covered magnificently by the guards. For the third time the survivors were rallied, the Gordons in the van, and pressed forward with short rushes. Backed by the Scots Guards the shattered brigade again drew close, ordered to hold on until sunset and then charge.
      General Cronje sent in a contingent to attempt a flanking movement on the open veldt and brought several guns into action at the close of the day, sweeping the utterly exhausted companies with a murderous fire. Flesh and blood could endure no longer. Without food or water, under a terrible fire, their arms, legs, and backs covered with vesicles from the blazing sun, the troops were unable to make further effort, but lay where they had fought, far into the night, and then crawled back out of range. Reluctantly Lord Methuen was forced to withdraw his command to the Modder River.


Lord Methuen’s troops fall back to the Modder River

In spite of these defeats, however, the mobilisation of the Ladysmith relieving column was completed by General Clery on December 11th, when General Buller reviewed the command, numbering 22,000 fighting men. Barton's composite brigade made the first advance on December 12th, escorting six naval guns to a kopje east of the railroad, dominating at 7,000 yards the entrenched ridges that menaced the wagon bridge crossing the Tugela. A heavy bombardment of the Boer position was sustained from 7 am. to 1 pm. on the following day, the Lyddite shells blowing great gaps in the opposite entrenchments. The enemy made no reply, and current rumour had it that they had become demoralised by the fire and had withdrawn.
      On December 14th a general advance was ordered; camp was struck and moved forward to a position beyond Chieveley, preparatory for an attack in force on the morrow. The naval guns advanced nearer the river and again pounded the enemy's position; but again the masked Boer guns were silent, and mounted patrols who ventured close to the river were not fired upon. When general orders were read that evening for the attack at daybreak, no one expected a severe fight, and most decided that the effective fire of the naval guns had taught the farmer foe a salutary lesson. The general supposition was that the enemy had removed his cannon out of range, and would make little opposition
      The railroad crosses the river by a massive bridge at Colenso, where the road runs north; and a wagon bridge and drift also cross at this point. The Boers had taken up a strong position on the north side of the crossing, where the advance of relief for Ladysmith, following the railroad from the coast, must cross the river. Meyer's defeat at Talana had led to the selection of Louis Botha, as direct commander under General Joubert to oppose the British advance.
      The Boers destroyed the massive railroad bridge at Colenso, but left the road bridge intact, occasionally sending patrols over as if they had retained it for their own use, and afterwards occupying the houses on the right bank to lure on the force. On their side of the river, Fort Wylie, evacuated by the British early in November, dominated the bridges. It was greatly strengthened by earthworks. The drifts or fords over the Tugela, marked on the field map, were cunningly altered by throwing dams across at night, rocks abounding for this purpose. Rows and rows of trenches were erected before these drifts, the defences being masked by brush and the natural rocks of the kopjes.


The railway bridge at Colenso tactically destroyed by the Boers
(viewed from Fort Wylie)


From the left or Boer bank of the river successive kopjes rise in tiers, extending along the entire front and ranging backward toward the north in irregular groups to lofty eminences, Grobler's Kloof and Red Hill, which formed the centre of the Boer position, commanding the entire sloping plain on the line of advance. On these heights they mounted their big guns.
      General orders were issued that night and at 3 am. on Friday, December 15th, the British camp was struck and the entire force moved forward. Outposts and scouts advanced toward the river, but not a shot was fired. A few burghers galloped madly across the bridge and away as General Hildyard's brigade moved forward in open order beside the railroad. Skirmishers fired at the houses on the south side of the water, which had been occupied by the enemy on the previous day, but not a rifle replied, and there was not a sign of life on either side of the Tugela, save on the far kopjes at the north centre of the position, where a group of mounted burghers were apparently riding away for dear life.
      "Afraid of our naval guns! They have moved their own heavy pieces out of action!" was the general comment. The troops stepped forward with an eagerness of action after long restraint, and the proud smile of victory assured. No one supposed that the farmer foe would be mad enough to place their advance across the river which would cut off their retreat, to face advancing columns that must hurl them back into the water. Perhaps such tactics were the result of Boer over-confidence, but such over-confidence, if it invites disaster, sometimes achieves victory.


A 4.7 inch naval gun in action at Colenso

Down toward the Tugela moved the brigades, looking only at the positions across the water. On the right centre bombardiers rode right to the river bank crossing empty Boer trenches that led from a clump of woods. With Captain White-Thomson they found the range in the open without molestation, and reported the ground clear of the enemy. Colonel Long, leaving the slower oxen to bring forward the naval 12 pounders, then led the two field batteries of his division at a smart trot far ahead of the infantry to within 800 yards of the river to sweep the kopjes on the far side. Sectional commanders gave the objective, Fort Wylie, the range 1,200 yards, and the guns swept down in line at 6.20 am. with neither sight nor sound of the enemy.
      Suddenly .. "Bang!" .. from a signal gun beyond the river. Then burst a sound like an anchor chain rattling through the hawse hole, a crash of thunder and a ripping, tearing, whistling and detonation as if all the fiends in hell were loosed.
      Maxims and automatic 1-pounders had opened from the kopjes by the river, every gun on the hills behind had spoken. And from every ridge and the fort beyond the Tugela, and worse yet, from the trenches on the south bank of the river, which had been quickly reoccupied by the Ermelo commando under cover of the thicket, a terrific rifle fire burst in the face of the British. The two batteries bore the brunt in the centre. Without direct support, they were assailed with a hail of bullets poured in at point-blank range, the terrible phut-phut gun across the river searched them out with its cruel little shells, and ere the guns were unlimbered half the teams were down, gunners and drivers were writhing on the ground, and it was impossible to retire from the trap. The discipline of the artillery responded to the test. The wagons were somewhat sheltered in a donga, but the detachment numbers, rushing forward, cut loose the tangled teams, dragged the limbers behind the guns, changed teams to replace casualties, and served ammunition as if on a field day, the gunners working the guns steadily until Fort Wylie and the surrounding kopjes erupted with bursting shrapnel.
      The Creusots on Grobler's had the exact range, however, and their 40-pound missives of steel and balls ploughed their way through the devoted batteries. One shell wiped a sub-division practically out of existence, but the survivors, finding their gun useless, ran to augment the detachments on either side of them.
      Colonel Long fell dangerously wounded fifteen minutes after the fight opened, and was carried to a donga in rear, shot through the stomach, arm, and back. Delirious from the sun and loss of blood, he continually muttered, “My brave gunners! my brave gunners!” The two battery captains, Goldie and Schrieber, were shot dead. Colonel Hunt fell next. Then Lieutenants Gethin and Elton were wounded, but they clung to their guns until a second bullet brought down Elton, and Gethin fainted from loss of blood. Lieutenant Gryles was shot trying to aid Schrieber; the sub-division sergeants had suffered as severely, but the surviving subalterns, Holford, with his face gashed by a splinter, and Birch, distributed the depleted detachment through the batteries and slaved at the guns with their men to the last. Splendid fellows were these stalwart British gunners who grimly stood by their guns in the face of certain death. Hellas could not have produced greater heroes; Leonidas would have been proud of such.
      "You must abandon the battery," shouted a sergeant as he sank wounded and the fire increased. "No use being torn up like field dummies," screamed a Dublin officer, as he scrambled down the bank and felt his way into the drift. He fell, but a few men were following. Then a little bugler of the Dublins named Dunn, who had been ordered to the rear but had trudged on with his company, ran in the lead, sounding the advance. Several companies immediately fixed bayonets and dashed down to the water. They were met with a heavy fire, but the shrill notes of the boy rang above the volleys, until a shrapnel burst over him, mangling the brave young body which was swept down stream.
      General Buller, together with General Clery, who was in operational command, had followed the advance closely. They had ridden along the line to try to avert disaster, fearlessly exposing themselves. Both were slightly wounded, Buller by a shrapnel ball, Clery grazed by a bullet, and several officers of their staff were killed around them. The enemy pressed their advantage, closing in force on the right of the British line. Along the whole British line, the checked regiments held their ground. The midsummer sun blazed down furiously on the unprotected men, but continued exposure was futile, and after eight hours' heavy fighting a general retirement was ordered.
      At 1.30 pm. the worn troops were at last out of rifle range, and plodded their way into camp, pursued by heavy but fortunately inferior shelling from the hills. The Boers then crossed the bridge, reoccupying their position along the south bank, which had taught a costly lesson that day. The withdrawal completed, the burghers swarmed over the bridge or swam the river at all points, and commenced to strip the wounded and dead. The veldt was strewn with helpless forms, and near Bridle Drift the dead lay in heaps. Their need of clothes and outfits may excuse the Boers, but brutes alone would strip wounded men and leave them naked under a blistering sun. Ghouls also hacked fingers off to secure rings, and some mocked and maltreated the stricken men. The Roman Catholic chaplain of the Irish, who remained on the field, reported that one Boer deliberately smashed in the face of a wounded private of the Rangers with his heel, shouting that he would "end all damn rooineks".
      The looting was stayed only by the approach of the ambulances, which were greeted by two field guns and several volleys fired at close range. The bearer companies were recruited from the Uitlanders, and several Americans were enrolled therein. They advanced steadily with a large Red Cross flag at their head, until the emblem itself was torn by bullets. In vain the surgeons, galloped to the Boer lines waving their handkerchiefs and pointing to the flag. Eighteen of the ambulance men were killed or wounded ere a Boer officer, more humane than his fellows, rode down the line and checked the firing.
      By sunset over 800 wounded had been collected on the field, passed through the Field Hospital, and been sent by train to the permanent hospitals at Estcourt, Pietermaritzburg, and Durban. During the evening an informal truce was arranged to bury the dead. The naval guns in rear had been trained to cover the abandoned batteries, and volunteers were ready to extricate them at night. Operations were suspended by the truce, under cover of which General Buller could have brought in his guns. He forbade the attempt, however, as a violation of the armistice; but the Boers, having no such scruples, and covered by the truce, hooked up teams and took the pieces over the river.
      In these disastrous days from December 6th to 17th then, we have suffered three crushing defeats with 2,776 men killed, wounded and captured. General Buller has suffered the commander’s ultimate failure; he has lost the respect of his men. And how quickly disaffection spreads; in a clever but cruel twist of word, the men who loved their leader yesterday speak of him, today, not as “Reevers” but as “Reverse”. It is now beyond doubt that he must be replaced and, just three days later, Tommy’s fragile morale is once again restored at the news that Lord Roberts is to leave Southampton imminently to take post as our new Commander-in-Chief.

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