After crossing the river we marched in the direction of the railroad, near which we halted until our planned departure time. During our halt the Russian troops crossed the pontoon bridge, followed by the British and French, and then took the river road, which was generally parallel to the railroad and a mile from it. We moved ahead at 6 o'clock, marching near the railroad embankment, which was around 20 feet high and 40 feet wide, revetted on both sides with stones and rock ballast. The railroad track had been entirely removed; the ties burned or carried away and the rails left strewn along the road.
Arriving within about a mile and a half of Yangtsun, we came across an enemy patrol of about 300 men occupying the section immediately in front of the bridge and the bend in the road, the railroad and the river road converging at this point. General Chaffee placed the 14th Infantry to attack along the west side of the railroad, where they connected with the British line. I crossed to the east side of the railroad embankment with a squad of Marines and a field battery under Captain Reilly, who were deployed to support the march of the 14th Infantry and the British troops. General Gaselee had sent a squadron of British cavalry to operate on our right flank.
As the 14th began their advance, the enemy opened fire on our right flank with artillery, and the commanding officer of the British cavalry reported that in the village directly on our right there were eight companies of Chinese infantry with three field guns. It was clearly unsafe to leave our right flank exposed to a force so strong, so General Chaffee directed a move against it. Our barrage very soon silenced the enemy guns and set the village ablaze; but this diversion had left the 14th with no cover and they were suffering terribly, even before the village had been completely cleared out.
There was no choice for General Chaffee but to abandon the movement on the village and re-direct his attack towards the enemy forces holding up the advance. Artillery, as well as infantry fire was being delivered from various villages to our right and in front, so our troops were sent into position to assist the 14th, intending to fire over the railroad embankment. Reilly's guns were unlimbered and about to open fire when we saw men of the 14th mount the embankment directly in front of our line of fire. Chafee ordered Captain Reilly to hold his fire, but within a minute of this order, the battery was fired upon by Chinese infantry and dismounted cavalry secreted in the cornfields within short range. Captain Reilly shifted his focus to the fields and opened fire upon them delivering a withering fusillade of shrapnel, which soon dispersed this force.
The 9th Infantry, which had come up on the right of battery, mistook the Chinese flag for the French and withheld their fire, losing an opportunity to inflict serious damage on the Chinese troops. I should remark in explanation of this that both the Russian and the French commanders were distributing messages throughout the lines, "to be careful not to fire on their troops which were advancing on Yangtsun", indicating that they were likely to pass close to our front line. As a matter of fact, neither the Russian or French troops were anywhere in front of us or to left, but these messages had been communicated to officers and staff, and in consequence of this all the troops were being particularly cautious.
The 14th Infantry assault continued against the Chinese position, with support on the left by the British troops, who were by now somewhat mixed with the 14th as a result of the contracted ground. The 14th should have held their attacking position on the west side of the railroad, but they had veered east to assist the British commander who had insisted on their support on his right flank. In this attack the 14th Infantry suffered considerable losses with 7 men killed and 57 wounded and it is with some sadness that I have to report that probably 25 or 30 of these casualties were the result of fire from the British and Russian batteries.
The advance of the 14th Infantry ended at the railroad embankment, while the 9th Infantry, the Marines, and Reilly's battery continued to advance northward through the villages to the east of Yangtsun until we reached the north end of the city, where opposition had practically dispersed and, here, the operations of the day ceased.
During the advance of the 9th Infantry, Lieutenant Lang and 5 men of his regiment were wounded. One man in the Marines was wounded; as were two men and two horses of Reilly's battery. The day was intensely hot and the troops had suffered horribly for the want of water and from the heat. Quite a number were unable to keep up with the advance and only arrived in camp after nightfall, while two so afflicted died on the field.
In the conference at Tientsin it had agreed that the first step of the advance on Peking should terminate at Yangtsun; and that a further conference should be held there to determine what was to be done next. The troops remained in camp at Yangtsun during 7th August; the dead were buried and the wounded sent by boats back to Tientsin. During the morning of the 7th a conference was held at the headquarters of the Russian commander, and it was decided that the forward movement should be resumed the next day to Ho-hsi-wu, where our scouts had reported that the Chinese had constructed an intricate complex of dams and ditches in their efforts to drain the river and flood the surrounding ground; an attempt that had fortunately been abandoned in their flight.
From Ho-hsi-wu, we would then continue to Tung Chow, where a final conference should be held to agree plans for the attack on Peking. All the armies would concentrate at Ho-hsi-wu during the day and night of 8th August, and the march be resumed at 4 o'clock on the following day.
Arriving within about a mile and a half of Yangtsun, we came across an enemy patrol of about 300 men occupying the section immediately in front of the bridge and the bend in the road, the railroad and the river road converging at this point. General Chaffee placed the 14th Infantry to attack along the west side of the railroad, where they connected with the British line. I crossed to the east side of the railroad embankment with a squad of Marines and a field battery under Captain Reilly, who were deployed to support the march of the 14th Infantry and the British troops. General Gaselee had sent a squadron of British cavalry to operate on our right flank.
As the 14th began their advance, the enemy opened fire on our right flank with artillery, and the commanding officer of the British cavalry reported that in the village directly on our right there were eight companies of Chinese infantry with three field guns. It was clearly unsafe to leave our right flank exposed to a force so strong, so General Chaffee directed a move against it. Our barrage very soon silenced the enemy guns and set the village ablaze; but this diversion had left the 14th with no cover and they were suffering terribly, even before the village had been completely cleared out.
There was no choice for General Chaffee but to abandon the movement on the village and re-direct his attack towards the enemy forces holding up the advance. Artillery, as well as infantry fire was being delivered from various villages to our right and in front, so our troops were sent into position to assist the 14th, intending to fire over the railroad embankment. Reilly's guns were unlimbered and about to open fire when we saw men of the 14th mount the embankment directly in front of our line of fire. Chafee ordered Captain Reilly to hold his fire, but within a minute of this order, the battery was fired upon by Chinese infantry and dismounted cavalry secreted in the cornfields within short range. Captain Reilly shifted his focus to the fields and opened fire upon them delivering a withering fusillade of shrapnel, which soon dispersed this force.
The 9th Infantry, which had come up on the right of battery, mistook the Chinese flag for the French and withheld their fire, losing an opportunity to inflict serious damage on the Chinese troops. I should remark in explanation of this that both the Russian and the French commanders were distributing messages throughout the lines, "to be careful not to fire on their troops which were advancing on Yangtsun", indicating that they were likely to pass close to our front line. As a matter of fact, neither the Russian or French troops were anywhere in front of us or to left, but these messages had been communicated to officers and staff, and in consequence of this all the troops were being particularly cautious.
The 14th Infantry assault continued against the Chinese position, with support on the left by the British troops, who were by now somewhat mixed with the 14th as a result of the contracted ground. The 14th should have held their attacking position on the west side of the railroad, but they had veered east to assist the British commander who had insisted on their support on his right flank. In this attack the 14th Infantry suffered considerable losses with 7 men killed and 57 wounded and it is with some sadness that I have to report that probably 25 or 30 of these casualties were the result of fire from the British and Russian batteries.
The advance of the 14th Infantry ended at the railroad embankment, while the 9th Infantry, the Marines, and Reilly's battery continued to advance northward through the villages to the east of Yangtsun until we reached the north end of the city, where opposition had practically dispersed and, here, the operations of the day ceased.
During the advance of the 9th Infantry, Lieutenant Lang and 5 men of his regiment were wounded. One man in the Marines was wounded; as were two men and two horses of Reilly's battery. The day was intensely hot and the troops had suffered horribly for the want of water and from the heat. Quite a number were unable to keep up with the advance and only arrived in camp after nightfall, while two so afflicted died on the field.
In the conference at Tientsin it had agreed that the first step of the advance on Peking should terminate at Yangtsun; and that a further conference should be held there to determine what was to be done next. The troops remained in camp at Yangtsun during 7th August; the dead were buried and the wounded sent by boats back to Tientsin. During the morning of the 7th a conference was held at the headquarters of the Russian commander, and it was decided that the forward movement should be resumed the next day to Ho-hsi-wu, where our scouts had reported that the Chinese had constructed an intricate complex of dams and ditches in their efforts to drain the river and flood the surrounding ground; an attempt that had fortunately been abandoned in their flight.
From Ho-hsi-wu, we would then continue to Tung Chow, where a final conference should be held to agree plans for the attack on Peking. All the armies would concentrate at Ho-hsi-wu during the day and night of 8th August, and the march be resumed at 4 o'clock on the following day.
(courtesy of Digital Collections. NYPL)
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